Israel’s Nuclear Weapons Program, Opacity Policy, and Instability in the Middle East.
While Israel is known to possess nuclear capabilities, leaders of Israel have not yet publicly recognized their nuclear weapons program.1 The failure of Israel to discuss its nuclear program has caused ambiguity in the international community, as nations believe Israel to have nuclear weapons, but because Israel denies conducting nuclear tests, the status of Israel’s weapons program is not completely known. Although Israel has not stated it has nuclear capabilities, the nations surrounding Israel, especially Iran, believe that Israel possesses nuclear weapons, and as such believes that it is in their best interest to build a nuclear weapons program.
A lack of clarity in regards to its nuclear weapons program prevents Israel from gaining legitimacy from the international community, meaning that Israel may not be viewed as a responsible owner of nuclear weapons. Israel’s close relationship with the United States creates problems for the United States’ foreign policy, as Israel is the largest recipient of American military aid, and refuses to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty.2 This paper will argue that the inconsistency exhibited in the United States’ foreign policy in regards to Israel’s nuclear weapons program hurts the United States’ standing in the United Nations and Arab nations, and Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons creates instability in the Middle East.
Israel’s Founding and History
In order to understand the controversy surrounding Israel’s nuclear weapons program, it is necessary to explore both the origins of Israel and the motivations behind its aggressive behavior. Israel was founded in 1948 after Britain allowed the Palestine territory to become independent following the expiration of the British Mandate on Palestine.3 Following Britain’s withdrawal from Palestine, the UN crafted a partition to create separate Jewish and Arab states in Palestine, which was rejected by the Arab states.4 “The modern State of Israel was founded in a self conscious act of continuity with the Jewish states of antiquity and was cast as a revolt against the conditions of minority status and powerlessness during the two millennia that the Jews spent in Diaspora.”5 In order to create unity in a new nation formed by a large number of diverse immigrants, leaders in Israel attempted to craft a shared history of Israel, and “under the inspiration of Prime Minister David Ben Gurion, during the 1940s and 1950s history was used by the state as an integrative device.”6
Creating such a history has led to multiple revisions of Israeli history, which idolizes military victories and consistently clashes with Arab interpretations of history.7 Israeli leaders sought to incorporate Zionist ideas of historical ties between Jews and Israel.8 History taught from the Jewish perspective created a somewhat mythical interpretation of battles between Jews and oppressors, including members of the military climbing the Masada “to take their oath of loyalty,” symbolizing how historical events continue to have meaning in modern day Israel, and influence their idea of needing to protect itself against invasion.9 “The interweaving of biblical, post-biblical, and recent history is typical of how the past is read and regurgitated for public consumption in Israel.”10 Such a presentation of history illustrates how Zionism could permeate foreign policy, as Prime Minister Ben-Gurion advocated a nationalistic perspective of history in order to unify a new country and demonstrate the need to protect its security interests.
Immediately after declaring its independence, Israel was attacked by neighboring Arab states seeking to abolish the Jewish state during the Arab-Israeli War in 1948.11 Israel captured nearly eighty percent of Palestine, and gained territory in Lebanon.12 During the 1956 Suez Canal War, Israel coordinated a pre-emptive strike against Egypt in order to seize the Milta Pass in Sinai.13 In 1967, Egyptian aggression led to Israel invading and capturing the Sinai Peninsular, the Golan Heights of Syria, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank during the Six-Day War.14 Following the end of the Six-Day War, the UN passed a resolution making Israeli withdrawal conditional on neighboring states recognizing Israel’s “right to exist within secure and recognized borders, free from threats of force.”15 In 1973, several Arab nations, including Egypt and Syria, attacked Israel on Yom Kippur in an attempt to regain lost territory.16
Israel led a counter insurgency that drove the Arab nations out of Israel, after support was given by the United States, who became involved after the Soviets aided the attacking Arab nations.17 Following the end of the Yom Kippur War, Israel returned territory it seized in 1967.18 The Lebanon War of 1982 followed provocation by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and attempted assassinations of Israeli officials.19 During the Oslo peace talks, which involved Israel, the PLO, the United States, and Russia, Israel agreed to remove troops from parts of the Gaza Strip and the West Banks, and create the Palestinian Authority to oversee land under its jurisdiction.20
The Oslo Accords were meant to serve as the foundation for continued peace talks. The motivation for perceived Israeli aggression was rooted in Israel’s fear of annihilation, which was driven by anti-Semitic sentiments in Arab countries and the desire to dissolve Israel.21 Israelis maintained a sense of fear following the Holocaust and the rise of groups such as the PLO, which has resulted in a military buildup and pre-emptive strikes.22 Israel has been reluctant to adopt cease-fire agreements and other negotiated settlements out of fear that the other party/parties would not uphold the agreement.23 Radical nationalism supported by ideologies such as Zionism has also contributed to Israeli aggression, although moderates typically control government policy.
The United States and Israel’s Weapons Program
The United States’ view of Israel’s nuclear defiance is exceptional, in that President Obama stated that the United States “strongly believes that, given its size, its history, the region that it’s in…. Israel has unique security requirements. It’s got to be able to respond to threats…And the United States will never ask Israel to take any steps that would undermine [its] security interests.”24 Beginning in 1969, the United States’ official position regarding Israeli nuclear weapons was “as long as Israel did not advertise its possession of nuclear weapons by publicly declaring or testing them, the United States would tolerate and shield Israel’s nuclear program.”25 The United States was an immediate and dedicated ally to Israel after its founding, and the United States viewed Israel as a peaceful country with neighboring hostile nations seeking to destroy the Jewish state.26 Following Israel’s creation, and initial efforts towards obtaining nuclear weapons, President “Dwight D. Eisenhower had a sphinx-like attitude towards the military implications of the Israeli nuclear research program.”27 During Eisenhower’s presidency, the United States viewed Israel as “at a crossroads” in terms of nuclear proliferation.28 The United States became aware of Israel’s nuclear proliferation to some extent, and “Eisenhower’s causes for concern was not Israeli nuclear weapons capability itself, but the Arab reaction to such capability.”29
During John F. Kennedy’s presidency, Kennedy feared a nuclear Israel would spur an arms race, and discouraged Israel from possessing nuclear weapons.30 A nuclear Israel conflicted with Kennedy’s desire to attain global nonproliferation, and threatened to increase Soviet involvement in Middle East politics, as the Soviets could arm Israel’s enemies.31 Kennedy convinced Israel to allow weapons inspections in order to confirm Israel’s nuclear program was for peaceful purposes.32 Despite agreeing to weapons inspections, Israel restricted the amount of information American weapons inspectors could review, as “the concealment of key operations ensured that U.S. intelligence community found no incriminating weapons-related activities.”33 Following Lyndon B. Johnson’s inauguration after Kennedy’s assassination, Johnson sought to “avoid confrontation with Israel on the nuclear issue,” and the practice of Israeli secrecy continued without criticism from the Johnson administration.34 Although Johnson strongly supported the new Non-Proliferation Treaty, in which signors agreed not to obtain nuclear weapons, Israel refused to sign the agreement.35 Israel “secretly crossed the nuclear threshold” in 1967, and by 1969, Richard Nixon and his administration became aware of Israel’s new, but private, status as a nuclear state.36
Henry Kissinger wrote a memo to Nixon stating that the United States’ “interest is in preventing Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons. But since we can not…control the state of Israel’s nuclear program and since Israel may already have nuclear weapons, the one objective we might achieve is to persuade them to keep what they have secret.”37 During a meeting between Nixon and Israeli Prime Minister Meir, the two countries agreed that Israel would not “test atomic weapons, advertise its possession of them, or threaten any state with its newfound nuclear capability…Washington, in turn, will end its visits to Dimona and stop pressuring Israel to sign the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT).”38 The United States committed to Israel’s policy of opacity to protect American interests during the Cold War, as having a democratic ally in the Middle East served to counterbalance efforts by the Soviets to gain allies in the region.39
Israel’s official policy regarding nuclear weapons is one of opacity, which “was codified in 1969 in an extraordinary secret accord between Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir and U.S. President Richard Nixon.”40 Issues regarding Israeli nuclear weapons created the National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM), “a series of policy studies initiated by National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and produced by the national security bureaucracy for the Nixon Whitehouse.”41 While the NSSM has slowly become declassified the past several decades, the meeting between Nixon and Meir lack a written record, and the content of the meeting remains ambiguous.42 During Nixon and Meir’s discussion, both leaders were grappling with the decision to sign the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the United States’ position held that there was no difference between “friendly” and “hostile” proliferation.43 Having a “strong international treaty” was considered the best way to establish an “international norm” of non-proliferation.44
Nixon questioned the ability of the NPT to combat nuclear proliferation, and disagreed with the idea that there was no defensive use of nuclear weapons, a view that greatly helped Israel’s argument for obtaining nuclear weapons.45 Although Nixon doubted that the NPT would successfully promote non-proliferation, he publicly supported the treaty, and submitted it to Congress.46 “Between February and April 1969,” the Nixon administration recognized Israel’s progression towards nuclear capabilities, and understood that Israel’s proliferation warranted discussion.47 Nixon’s administration viewed a nuclear Israel as having “dangerous implications for the U.S,” but little support transpired for a policy that openly condemned Israel’s nuclear proliferation.48 “Even today, the contents of NSSM 40 are still highly sensitive; it is the only NSSM that cannot be accessed on the Internet through the Nixon Presidential Library, which describes it as “fully classified.”49 Memos within the administration varied in their recommendations for reactions to Israel’s nuclear weapons program, but many members of Nixon’s administration recognized that Israel’s nuclear proliferation would destabilize the Middle East region.50 One option considered by Nixon was withholding the sale of Phantom jets to Israel if Israel continued its nuclear proliferation, as Nixon viewed the “physical possession” of weapons “constituted introduction.”51
The United States pressured Israel to the sign the NPT, but Israel has yet to sign the treaty.52 “While the United States had to acknowledge it would be impossible to persuade Israel to give up its nuclear program, it might be difficult, but not impossible, to persuade Israel to ‘freeze’ its nuclear program.”53 The United States viewed private possession as less detrimental than public knowledge of nuclear weapons, and was willing to compromise with Israel’s insistence on having nuclear weapons. Nixon did not want to exert pressure on Israel to halt its weapons program, perhaps because he viewed Israel’s proliferation as a defensive measure.54 Ultimately, Nixon refused to withhold fighter planes from Israel as a means to leverage against Israel’s nuclear program, preventing the United States from acting upon its disapproval of Israel’s proliferation.55 Although Nixon’s administration was adamant in pressing Israel to discontinue its weapon program and sign the NPT, Nixon did not share their perspective.56 Nixon met with Golda Meir privately, and reached a secret agreement regarding Israel’s nuclear program.57 It is speculated that Meir confided in Nixon that Israel had nuclear weapons, and Nixon, at least tacitly, endorsed Israel’s proliferation.58 “Decades later, reliable American sources unofficially confirmed” Israel’s promise to keep their weapons program private in exchange for a cessation of American visits to the Dimona site.59
In a speech in Guam, Nixon stated the United States would support allies who would strengthen their military in order to limit communist influence from the Soviet Union, as Nixon viewed Israel as a strategic asset in the middle east, and therefore found it acceptable for Israel to have nuclear weapons.60 Based on the secret agreement between Nixon and Meir, Israel would not sign the NPT, as signing would signal Israel did not possess nuclear weapons, which directly contradicted Nixon’s knowledge of Israel’s weapons program.
Israel’s Nuclear Weapons Program
“Acknowledgement-let alone acceptance- of Israel as a new member of the nuclear club was antithetical to the culture and assumptions of that establishment.”61 Israel did not support publicly declaring their presence as a nuclear weapons state, and instead advocated for a policy of opacity.62 The policy refuses to confirm or deny “its possession of nuclear weapons; indeed, the government refuses to say anything factual about Israel’s nuclear activities, and Israeli citizens are encouraged, both by law and custom, to follow suit.”63 The policy denied declaring Israel as a nuclear or non-nuclear state, because Israel failed to see a strategic advantage in either option.64 Despite Israel’s silence in the international community regarding its status as a nuclear state, Israel’s “founding father, David Ben-Gurion, dreamt about the bomb since Israel was born.”65 Israel began building its nuclear facilities “in Dimona with French assistance.”66 The two main reasons why Israel considered obtaining nuclear weapons was to “deter any attack by hostile neighbors,” and Israel’s belief that other nations would not protect its existence.67 Israel’s suspicion that other nations would attempt to annihilate the Jewish state is rooted in Holocaust paranoia, in that Israel’s leaders deeply believe that other nations pose a substantial threat to its safety.68 Additionally, Israel views a nuclear option as essential to its security, acting as “both the ploughshare and the sword,” and was motivated to obtain nuclear weapons to use as a deterrent against Arab and terrorist attacks.69
Israel was first considered a nuclear state, the sixth nation in the world, in the 1960s.70 France developed a close relationship with Israel following the Suez War, with Israel also gaining generous support from the United States through the Atoms for Peace program.71 In 1957, Israel signed an agreement with the United States “to build a swimming pool-type nuclear research reactor as part of the Nasal Soreq Nuclear Centre (MAMAG)…MAMAG, which went critical in 1960, was an important step for the Israeli nuclear program.”72 Additionally, France provided substantial support for Israel’s nuclear program, and “according to a note in a French diplomatic documents collection…the turning point of technological transfer was a secret agreement signed on August 23, 1957 for the research and development of nuclear weapons.”73 France also assisted Israel in constructing “a laboratory for plutonium separation.”74 In 1959, “Israel asked London for samples of liquid rocket propellant,” as it was necessary in building a nuclear warhead.75 Britain declined.76 Although Britain refused to assist Israel’s quest for nuclear technology, the United States agreed to sell Israel a second reactor, conditional on Israel using it for peaceful purposes.77 In 1960, the French government discontinued its nuclear cooperation with Israel, as Israel refused to allow an inspection of the Dimona facility.78 However, private French firms continued to work with Israel on nuclear technology.79
By the end of 1960, both the American and British press published material uncovering Israel’s nuclear weapons programs, and the West became aware that Israel was not using nuclear technology solely for peaceful purposes.80 In December of 1960, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) discovered that the “Israelis had undertaken a secret nuclear programme using the know how provided by the French and built a laboratory for the separation of plutonium at Dimona in order to create an atomic arsenal.”81 The discovery led to an American investigation into the Israeli nuclear weapons program, as it demonstrated a serious intelligence error.82 What the United States knew about Israel’s nuclear weapons program is unclear, as the government publicly stated that the Israeli weapons program was unknown until 1960, but memos and phone conversations demonstrate that the United States government knew that Israel was building a large facility that was potentially a nuclear site as early as 1958.83 The United States inquired about Israeli’s nuclear capabilities, as Israeli proliferation could have a destabilizing impact on the Middle East, but Israel publicly denied any claims of proliferation or intent to proliferate.84
Information leaked to the press linking Israel’s nuclear program to the United States, specifically that the United States military was funding Israeli nuclear proliferation.85 The United States publicly announced that they did not know the source of funding for Israel’s nuclear plants.86 Israel claimed that it made agreements with anonymous sources that required that Israel not reveal where the funds for the program were coming from, but Israel did agree to announce the Dimona site to its Parliament.87 Ben-Gurion stated that the Dimona site was for peaceful purposes, but made no claims that the nuclear program as a whole was for peaceful purposes and did not agree to allow any inspections of the Dimona site.88 The United States was opposed to Israeli nuclear proliferation.89 Israel eventually agreed to allow inspections by allies, but the United States continued to worry about how Arab nations in the Middle East would respond to the Dimona sites discovery, fearing that there could be a preemptive attack against Israel.90
The institutions that allow Israel to maintain its policy of opacity include the Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC), the Office of Security at the Ministry of Defense (MALMAB), and the Office of the Military Censore (Censora).91The IAEC is “the agency that has overall responsibility for Israel’s nuclear affairs.”92 The IAEC is largely secretive, with its budget and communications with other branches of government highly classified.93 Ben-Gurion formed the IAEC under a secret executive order in 1952.94 The IAEC, publicly, was the administration that housed scientists who were seeking nuclear energy, but privately it was Israel’s organization dedicated to nuclear proliferation.95 Within the Israeli government, the Prime Minister was the main overseer of nuclear technology, which was rooted in a series of informal documents leading to an uncodified constitution.96 The document essentially allowed the prime minister to also function as the minister of defense, allowing the prime minister to control most aspects the nuclear weapons program.97 Despite the extensive power of the prime minister, the decision to “mobilize the system into an operational mode,” was shared between the prime minister, minister of defense, and the army chief of staff.98
The “second layer in Israel’s nuclear-intelligence infrastructure” is MALMAB, which is “one of the most secretive and autonomous agencies in Israel’s Ministry of Defense (MOD).”99 MALMAB is responsible for securing nuclear locations, such as the Dimona site, and became Israel’s unofficial fourth intelligence agency.100 The agency is central in developing information technology, which increased MALMAB’s power.101Additionally, MALMAB provides “security services to the entire civilian defense establishment,” a function that makes MALMAB a central part in the MOD’s operations.102 MALMAB is committed to protecting Israel’s opacity policy, which “gave the MALMAB unique voice of authority and judgment on a highly sensitive subject,” as well as the “final security authority for everything in the nuclear program.103
The Office of Military Censor, known in Israel as Censora, is the third layer of Israel’s nuclear intelligence institutions.104 “If the first two organizations, the IAEC and the MALMAB, operate almost invisibly…the Censora is the gatekeeper between the state’s secrets and the external world.”105 The Censora reviews all information regarding Israel’s nuclear weapons program before it is released to the public, censoring material in order to protect Israel’s opacity policy. Currently, Israel is “the only Western democracy that maintains an active military censorship institution.”106 Zionism was the main factor in creating the Censora, as the pre state era in Israel was adamant about censorship acting as a mechanism that would protect the public good.107 The origin of Zionist censorship was a voluntary agreement between the press and “the Haganah (the Jewish mainstream paramilitary organization),” demonstrating a distinct difference from more formal and involuntary censorship tactics used in countries such as Germany and Britain.108 Immediately after Israel declared independence, the Censora was formed, with any information regarding Israel’s military needing clearance from the Censora in order to receive publication.109
Interestingly, the Israeli press voluntarily conforms to the Censora’s demands of previewing sensitive material, and no formal law requiring or limiting censorship has passed in the Israeli government.110 Additionally, there is an agreement between the Censora and the press that creates a three-man panel that resolves disputes between the media and the Israeli government regarding censorship, which prevents censorship disputes from receiving public attention.111 Editors of Israeli newspapers receive confidential information from the Minister of Defense and Prime Minister regarding Israel’s nuclear weapons program, and therefore act as protectors of the opacity policy.112 When the Israeli government began building the Dimona facility, the Censora prevented publication of any information that contradicted Israel’s public position of opacity, as well as forbidding publication of Israel’s nuclear program posing diplomatic issues with Egypt.113
The Censora also bans any public documents or articles from mentioning Israel’s nuclear weapons program, therefore protecting Israel’s position of not publicly acknowledging its weapons program. In 1989, Israel’s Supreme Court, after Meir Schnitzer, editor of Ha’ir magazine, filed a claim challenging the Censora’s censorship of an article, ruled that the Censora could only censor material that could cause “grievous harm to national security.”114 The ruling demonstrates that Israel is becoming less secretive about its military initiatives and actions, although the Israeli press is not advocating for the abolishment of the Censora.115
Diplomacy Attempts in the Middle East
Iran proposed, with the support of Egypt, a nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East in 1974, and Israel refused to vote on the proposition for several years.116 The consideration for a NWFZ in the Middle East gained support from the United Nations, but Israel largely ignored the initiative.117 The Arms Control and Regional Services (ACRS) met following the Gulf War, bringing together most Arab nations to discuss arms control, with the talks occurring from 1992 to 1995.118 Israel refused to discuss nuclear weapons, which resulted in the end of the ACRS talks.119 The presence of terrorist attacks, and Arab nations private endorsement of terrorist groups, creates a threat to Israel’s security.120 With Arab governments refusing to crack down on acts of terrorism, Israel refuses to discuss its nuclear weapons program or disarmament.121 Neighboring nations view Israel’s conventional superiority, which Israel has demonstrated through multiple military confrontations, as enough security for Israel, and have already accepted Israel’s existence.122 “
Thus Arab and Iranian worlds view Israel’s nuclear weapons not as a last-resort deterrent, but rather as a protective umbrella under which the illegal and unjust annexation of occupied territories continues.”123 Israel’s neighbors believe that Israel’s nuclear weapons are an offensive, not a defensive, security measure.124 Arab nations’ views on weapons is that Arab states would be willing to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) if Israel signed the NPT, but Israel views their neighbors refusal to sign the CWC as a reason to possess nuclear weapons.125 Israel is also the only nation within the Middle East that has not signed the NPT.126 One major issue for Israel in signing arms control agreements is the lack of trust between Israel and neighboring states, a result of multiple military conflicts.127
Israel, The United States, and the United Nations
Israel’s military and nuclear capabilities were first recorded in the United Nations records in 1978, when “a number of States expressed concern in the debate over continued and rapid Israeli build-up of weapons and considered it imperative that Israel be prevented from obtaining nuclear weapons.”128 The General Assembly raised concerns regarding “evidence of Israeli attempts to acquire nuclear weapons.”129
In 1981, the United Nations General Assembly adopted resolution 36/87 A regarding “Nuclear Weapons And Israel,” which sought to research and explain Israel’s nuclear weapons program.130 The resolution was concerned about a study investigating Israel’s nuclear facilities, and “consisted of an introduction, four main chapters- on Israel’s nuclear development, its nuclear-weapon potential, factors affecting its nuclear policy and international reports concerning its nuclear armament- and conclusions.”131 The study concludes that Israel “had failed to adhere to the non-Proliferation Treaty and to submit all of its nuclear facilities to international inspection, and also appeared to undermine the credibility of nuclear safeguards supervised by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), particularly by the bombing of an Iraqi nuclear reactor which was under IAEA safeguards.”132 Additionally, the study finds that while it could not conclusively confirm Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons, it did acknowledge that Israel had “the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons within a short time.”133
The Group believed that it would contribute to avoiding the danger of a nuclear-arms race in the Middle East if Israel should renounce the possession of or any intention to possess nuclear weapons and agree to submit all of its nuclear activities to international safeguards.”134 The General Assembly agreed that Israel’s potential possession of nuclear weapons was a major destabilizing factor in the Middle East, and Israel’s refusal to allow IAEA inspections compromised the integrity of the IAEA and the United Nations.135 Furthermore, the resolution “demanded that Israel renounce any possession of nuclear weapons and place all of its nuclear activities under international safeguards.”136
The resolution sought to establish a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East, and the United States exercised its veto power to halt the passage of resolution 36/87 A, despite the vote having approval by a 93 to 2 (32 absentations) margin during a vote held on November 24, 1981.137 Israel argued the committee charged with conducting the study of Israel’s nuclear facilities was biased, as the only nuclear physicist was Arab.138 The United States supported Israel’s position, objecting “to any attempt to engage the Security Council in what it called an unbalanced and politically motivated act.”139
Also in 1981, the United Nations General Assembly directly addresses Israel’s nuclear armament under resolutions 36/98.140 The resolution notes “with concern that Israel has persistently refused to adhere to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons despite repeated calls by the General Assembly and the Security Council to place its nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.”141 The resolution also cites the United Nation’s disapproval of Israel’s cooperation with South Africa to aid South Africa’s development of nuclear capabilities, and condemned Israel’s bombing of Iraq’s nuclear facilities.142 Both actions are viewed by the United Nations as undermining its legitimacy, and requested “the Security Council to prohibit all forms of co-operation with Israel in the nuclear field.”143
In 1983, the United Nations General Assembly re affirmed its resolutions in 1981 through the approval of resolution 38/69.144 It states the United Nations is “conscious of the grave consequences which endanger international peace and security as a result of Israel’s development and acquisition of nuclear weapons.”145 Additionally, it notes the Secretary General’s report that condemns Israel’s actions to ignore the United Nations continued requests to undergo nuclear inspections and condemns “the Israeli threat.”146 The following year, the General Assembly reiterated the concerns over Israel’s nuclear proliferation, condemning the nation for failing to follow various resolutions demanding Israel to conform to international standards of nuclear transparency.147 In 1985, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research conducted “a study on Israeli nuclear armament,” and, similar to the 1981 study, could not reach a definitive conclusions as to whether or not Israel possessed nuclear capabilities.148 Israel again claimed that it was being “singled out for investigation from among all the countries which were advanced in nuclear technology and non-parties to the NPT.”149 The United States reaffirmed its agreement with Israel that the condemnation of the United Nations against Israel was unfair and misdirected.150
In 1986, the Group of Arab States requested that Israel’s armament again receive attention by the General Assembly, and the General Assembly again condemned Israel for refusing to follow the United Nations requests for nuclear conformity with international nuclear norms.151 In a 1987 study, the Secretary-General concluded that enough circumstantial evidence existed to conclude that Israel possessed the necessary capabilities to proliferate.152 The United Nations discussed the possibility of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East in 1988, emphasizing that the United Nations would play a paramount role in attaining non-proliferation.153 The resolution requested “all countries of the region that have not done so, pending the establishment of the zone, to agree to place all their nuclear activities under the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards,” and “invites those countries, pending the establishment of the zone, not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons.”154
An additional resolution, 43/80, acknowledges that the IAEA condemned Israel for Israel’s “refusal to submit its nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards, in compliance with a 1981 Security Council resolution.”155 The resolution cites that the General Assembly is “deeply concerned by the information with regard to the continuing production, development and acquisition of nuclear weapons by Israel.”156 Despite the United States’ position on the Security Council, and a likely veto of any condemnation of Israel’s disobedience, the resolution urged the Security Council “to take urgent and effective measures to ensure that Israel complies with Council Resolution 487 (1981).”157 The General Assembly also “calls upon all States and organizations that have not yet done so to discontinue co-operating with giving assistance to Israel in the nuclear field.”158 The only two nations that voted against the resolution were Israel and the United States.159
Israel nuclear armaments were discussed in 1989 through the approval of resolution 44/121.160 The resolution notes Israel’s noncompliance with the General Assembly’s request to place Israel’s nuclear program under the IAEA, and most notably “reiterates condemnation of Israel’s refusal to renounce any possession of nuclear weapons.”161 The only nations to vote against the resolution were Israel and the United States, a trend that continued throughout the twentieth century.162 Resolution 45/63, adopted in 1990, again touched upon issues discussed in previous resolutions, adding concern over Israel’s nuclear tests in the Mediterranean.163 Rhetoric in resolution 46/39, passed in 1991, states that it “deplores Israel’s refusal to renounce possession of nuclear weapons,” and the tone otherwise follows previous resolutions.164 Israel, Romania, and the United States voted against the resolution, with the addition of Romania the only difference from past votes.165
In 1992, resolution 47/55 passed, which added a request for Israel to sign the NPT.166 Voting on resolution 48/78, which asked Israel “to renounce possession of nuclear weapons and to accede to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” was more controversial than previous resolutions regarding Israel’s nuclear weapons, as forty-five nations, including Israel and the United States, voted against the resolution.167 Resolution 48/78 was the last resolution pertaining to Israeli nuclear weapons in the “Yearbook of the United Nations” series.
Overall, the United States has used its veto power over one hundred times during its tenure in the United Nations, with forty-three vetoes defending Israel from General Assembly condemnations.168 In all forty-three vetoes favorable for Israel, the United States is the only member of the Security Council using its veto power.169 The voting record of the United States as a member of the Security Council between 1972 and 2011 is as follows:
Security Council Vetoes/Negative voting 1983-2011
The United States’ voting record within the United Nations demonstrates a clear departure from General Assembly resolutions, which undoubtedly puts the United States at odds with most countries belonging to the United Nations. The Arab nations almost exclusively voted for resolutions condemning Israel, putting the Arab block at odds with the United States.
Conclusions
Internationally, the United States is seeking a solution to the nuclear problem by attempting to find a means to convince countries to work together to disarm.171 Unfortunately, Israel continues to view opacity as beneficial, and nuclear weapons as a deterrent. Israel views Iranian nuclear proliferation as a serious existential threat, and therefore believes it must possess nuclear weapons.172 However, Iran’s motivation to obtain nuclear weapons can reasonably be viewed as the result of Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons. Israel has consistently shown a willingness to militarily engage neighboring countries, and to use a disproportionate amount of force when military conflicts arise. Additionally, Israel has demonstrated an unwillingness to engage diplomatically with other Middle Eastern nations, and refuses to surrender the occupied territories. Israel’s disregard for international condemnation for its nuclear weapons program further illustrates defiance for global order, which creates a threat to Iran and other non-nuclear states in the region. If Israel chooses to disarm, other nations in the Middle East would willingly sign disarmament agreements, as they have already signed the NPT. The United States’ continued use of its veto power for resolutions that condemn Israel puts it at odds with Arab nations, who consistently voted against Israel and the United States every time.
Sources
Dan Allin and Steven Simon. “The Moral Psychology of US Support for Israel.” International Institute for Strategic Studies vol. 45, no. 3, 123.
Bahgat, Gawdat. “Israel and Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East.” Middle East Policy Council, 2006. 113.
Cesarani, David. “Coming to Terms with the Past: Israel.” History Today. Feb. 2004. Vol. 54,
Cohen, Avner. The Worst-kept Secret: Israel's Bargain with the Bomb. New York: Columbia UP, 2010.
Cohen, Avner. "Israel's Nuclear Future: Iran, Opacity and the Vision of Global Zero." Palestine-Israel Journal 16.3 (2009): 1-19.
Cohen, Avner, and Marvin Miller. "Bringing Israel's Bomb Out of the Basement." Foreign Affairs 89.
Department of Public Information. “Yearbook of the United Nations: 1978, Volume 32.” United Nations, New York.
Department of Public Information.” Yearbook of the United Nations: 1981, Volume 35.” New York, 1981.
Department of Public Information. “Yearbook of the United Nations: 1983, Volume 37. 1987 United Nations.
Department of Public Information. “Yearbook of the United Nations: 1984, Volume 38. United Nations, New York, 1988.
Department of Public Information. “Yearbook of the United Nations: 1985, Volume 39. United Nations, New York, 1989.
Department of Public Information. “Yearbook of the United Nations: 1986, Volume 40. United Nations, New York, 1990.
Department of Public Information. “Yearbook of the United Nations: 1987, Volume 41. United Nations, New York, 1991.
Department of Public Information. “Yearbook of the United Nations: 1988, Volume 42. United Nations, New York, 1994.
Department of Public Information. “Yearbook of the United Nations: 1989, Volume 43. United Nations, New York, 1997.
Department of Public Information. “Yearbook of the United Nations: 1990, Volume 44. United Nations, New York, 1990.
Department of Public Information. “Yearbook of the United Nations: 1991, Volume 45. United Nations, New York, 1992.
Department of Public Information. “Yearbook of the United Nations: 1992, Volume 46. United Nations, New York, 1993.
Gerlini, Matteo. “Waiting for Dimona: The United States and Israel’s Development of Nuclear Capability.” Cold War History, Vol. 10, No. 2, May 2010
No Author. “Oslo Accords.” http://www.time.com/time/daily/special/mideast/html. Accessed November 15, 2010.
No Author. “U.S. Vetoes of U.N. Resolutions Critical of Israel.” http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/UN/usvetoes.html
Nossel, Suzanne. “Israel and UN Reform.” Dissent, Summer 2005, 24.
Rowley, Charles . “The Israel and Palestine Land Settlement Problem, 1948-2005: An Analytical History.” Public Choice vol. 128, 79.
Shalit, Erel. “The Relationship Between Aggression and Fear in the Annihilation in Israel.” Political Psychology, vol. 15, no. 3, 420.
Zunes, Stephen. “Israel, the United States, and the United States.” Tikkun vol. 18, no. 3, 24.
1 Gerlini, Matteo. “Waiting for Dimona: The United States and Israel’s Development of Nuclear Capability.” Cold War History, Vol. 10, No. 2, May 2010, 144.
2 Gerlini 144.
3 Dan Allin and Steven Simon. “The Moral Psychology of US Support for Israel.” International Institute for Strategic Studies vol. 45, no. 3, 123.
4 Suzanne Nossel. “Israel and UN Reform.” Dissent, Summer 2005, 24.
5 Cesarani, David. “Coming to Terms with the Past: Israel.” History Today. Feb. 2004. Vol. 54, Issue 2.
6 Ibid 1.
7 Ibid 1.
8 Ibid 1.
9 Ibid 2.
10 Ibid 2.
11 Ibid 24.
12 Charles Rowley. “The Israel and Palestine Land Settlement Problem, 1948-2005: An Analytical History.” Public Choice vol. 128, 79.
13 Ibid 80.
14 Stephen Zunes. “Israel, the United States, and the United States.” Tikkun vol. 18, no. 3, 24.
15 Ibid 26.
16 Erel Shalit. “The Relationship Between Aggression and Fear in the Annihilation in Israel.” Political Psychology, vol. 15, no. 3, 420.
17 Ibid 421.
18 Ibid 422.
19 Ibid 423.
20 “Oslo Accords.” http://www.time.com/time/daily/special/mideast/html. Accessed November 15, 2010.
21Ibid 420.
22 Zunes 23.
23 Shalit 424
24 Cohen, Avner, and Marvin Miller. "Bringing Israel's Bomb Out of the Basement." Foreign Affairs 89.5, 1.
25 Ibid 1.
26 Ibid 2.
27 Gerlini 144.
28 Ibid 144.
29 Ibid 145.
30 Cohen, Miller 2.
31 Ibid 2.
32 Ibid 3.
33 Ibid 3.
34 Ibid 3.
35 Ibid 3.
36 Ibid 3.
37 Ibid 3
38 Ibid 3.
39 Ibid 3.
40 Cohen and Miller, 1.
41 Cohen, Avner. The Worst-kept Secret: Israel's Bargain with the Bomb. New York: Columbia UP, 2010.1.
42 Ibid 2.
43 Ibid 5.
44 Ibid 5.
45 Ibid 6.
46 Ibid 7.
47 Ibid 8.
48 Ibid 9.
49 Ibid 11.
50 Ibid 13.
51 Ibid 14.
52 Ibid 14.
53 Ibid 17.
54 Ibid 18.
55 Ibid 23.
56 Ibid 25.
57 Ibid 25.
58 Ibid 26.
59 Ibid 26.
60 Ibid 28.
61 Ibid 7.
62 Ibid 7.
63 Ibid 1
64 Ibid 7.
65 Cohen, Avner. "Israel's Nuclear Future: Iran, Opacity and the Vision of Global Zero." Palestine-Israel Journal 16.3 (2009): 1-19.
66 Ibid 2.
67 Bahgat, Gawdat. “Israel and Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East.” Middle East Policy Council, 2006. 113.
68 Ibid 114.
69 Gerlini 147.
70 Bahgat 114.
71 Gerlini 144.
72 Gerlini 146.
73 Gerlini 146.
74 Gerlini 146.
75 Ibid 146.
76 Ibid 146.
77 Ibid 146.
78 Ibid 147.
79 Ibid 147.
80 Ibid 147.
81 Ibid 148.
82 Ibid 148.
83 Ibid 148.
84 Ibid 149.
85 Ibid 149.
86 Ibid 150.
87 Ibid 150.
88 Ibid 151.
89 Ibid 152.
90 Ibid 154.
91 Cohen 89
92 Ibid 89.
93 Ibid 89.
94 Ibid 90.
95 Ibid 91.
96 Ibid 96.
97 Ibid 96.
98 Ibid 97.
99 Ibid 101.
100 Ibid 104.
101 Ibid 105.
102 Ibid 106.
103 Ibid 107.
104 Ibid 109.
105 Ibid 109.
106 Ibid 110.
107 Ibid 110.
108 Ibid 110.
109 Ibid 111.
110 Ibid 111.
111 Ibid 111.
112 Ibid 113.
113 Ibid 113.
114 Ibid 115.
115 Ibid 119.
116 Baumgart and Miller 46.
117 Ibid 47.
118 Ibid 47.
119 Ibid 48.
120 Ibid 48.
121 Ibid 48.
122 Ibid 48.
123 Ibid 49.
124 Ibid 49.
125 Ibid 49.
126 Ibid 49.
127 Ibid 52.
128 Department of Public Information. “Yearbook of the United Nations: 1978, Volume 32.” United Nations, New York, 63.
129 Ibid 63.
130 Department of Public Information.” Yearbook of the United Nations: 1981, Volume 35.” New York, 1981, 51.
131 Ibid 51.
132 Ibid 51.
133 Ibid 51.
134 Ibid 51.
135 Ibid 51.
136 Ibid 51.
137 Ibid 51.
138 Ibid 51.
139 Ibid 51.
140 Ibid 52.
141 Ibid 52.
142 Ibid 52.
143 Ibid 52.
144 Department of Public Information. “Yearbook of the United Nations: 1983, Volume 37. 1987 United Nations, 44.
145 Ibid 44.
146 Ibid 44.
147 Department of Public Information. “Yearbook of the United Nations: 1984, Volume 38. United Nations, New York, 1988, 44.
148 Department of Public Information. “Yearbook of the United Nations: 1985, Volume 39. United Nations, New York, 1989, 44.
149 Ibid 65.
150 Ibid 65.
151 Department of Public Information. “Yearbook of the United Nations: 1986, Volume 40. United Nations, New York, 1990, 58.
152 Department of Public Information. “Yearbook of the United Nations: 1987, Volume 41. United Nations, New York, 1991, 64.
153 Department of Public Information. “Yearbook of the United Nations: 1988, Volume 42. United Nations, New York, 1994, 71.
154 Ibid 71.
155 Ibid 71.
156 Ibid 71.
157 Ibid 71.
158 Ibid 71.
159 Ibid 72.
160 Department of Public Information. “Yearbook of the United Nations: 1989, Volume 43. United Nations, New York, 1997, 61.
161 Ibid 62.
162 Ibid 62.
163 Department of Public Information. “Yearbook of the United Nations: 1990, Volume 44. United Nations, New York, 1990, 62.
164 Department of Public Information. “Yearbook of the United Nations: 1991, Volume 45. United Nations, New York, 1992, 47.
165 Ibid 47.
166 Department of Public Information. “Yearbook of the United Nations: 1992, Volume 46. United Nations, New York, 1993, 92.
167 Ibid 122.
168 “U.S. Vetoes of U.N. Resolutions Critical of Israel.” http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/UN/usvetoes.html
169 Ibid, 1.
170 Ibid 1.
171 Ibid 216.
172 Ibid 219.